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Dual Representations 
Abstract 
 
Investigations that focus on children’s hand gestures often conclude that gesture 
production arises as a result of having multiple representations. To date, the predictive 
validity of this notion has not been tested. In this study we compared the gestures of 
82 five-year old children holding either a single or a dual representation. The children 
retold a story narrated to them, with pictures, by the experimenter. In one condition 
the children heard a false belief story and hence, when retelling, held two beliefs – or 
representations - concurrently. In the other conditions the children retold a version of 
the story without the false belief component and therefore held single representations. 
Children were four times more likely to gesture in the false belief condition than in 
two comparable true belief conditions, supporting the notion that gestures may 
function to externalise some of the child’s cognitive process, particularly when they 
hold multiple representations. 
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The effects of single and dual representations on children’s gesture production 
 
Gesture is used freely by us all, spontaneously and largely without conscious 
awareness and is a robust phenomenon occurring across all ages and cultures. There is 
a growing body of literature that focuses on children’s gesture production, which sees 
gesture as a window to the mind of the child. Goldin-Meadow (2003) suggests that 
while speech conforms to a codified recognition system that conveys meaning in a 
discrete manner, gesture is free from the grammatical constraints of language and 
conveys meaning globally, without words, taking advantage of visual and mimetic 
imagery. Gesture will often match the speech produced, but at times, for example 
when knowing is in transition, there will be a mismatch between speech and gesture 
and gesture may convey different information. Gestures produced in parallel to speech 
allow the child to convey more than one idea or representation at any one time, thus   
reflecting a more accurate picture of the child’s thoughts.  
 
Studies of children’s gestures have largely focused on three major problem-solving 
domains: Piagetian conservation task (Church & Goldin-Meadow 1986; Goldin-
Meadow, Wein & Chang, 1992), mathematical equivalence task (Alibali, Kita & 
Young, 2000; Goldin-Meadow, S., Nusbaum, H., Kelly, S.D., & Wagner, S. 2001; 
Perry, Church & Goldin-Meadow 1988) and the balance beam task (Pine, Lufkin & 
Messer 2004). Each has demonstrated that there is consistency in the way different 
children gesture when given the same task and that it is possible for independent 
observers to categorise the gestures produced, as representing certain variables of the 
problem. Studies from all three domains have found that, following instruction, those 
children who initially produced gesture-speech mismatches, made significantly more 
 3
Dual Representations 
progress than those whose gesture and speech matched, suggesting that gesture-
speech mismatches are associated with a propensity to learn. Gesture-speech 
mismatches have been shown to be a reliable indicator of when a child’s knowledge is 
in transition and can reflect when the child is entertaining more than one hypothesis, 
or has more than one representation of the problem. This is associated with learning 
because this cognitive instability often presages the acquisition of the concept. Whilst 
not a new idea (Piaget proposed disequilibrium theory in 1975) the finding that 
gestures reflect transition is a significant one. 
 
Therefore gesture is not merely communicative but is integral to the child’s cognitive 
processes. This is endorsed by observations of those blind from birth, who gesture 
spontaneously in a similar way to sighted people, even if the person they are speaking 
to is also blind (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow 1998). This, it is argued, is because 
gestures are important for the speaker. They reflect the ongoing cognitive process, 
assist in the conceptual packaging of information to be conveyed and can reduce 
cognitive load. Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly and Wagner (2001) tested the 
cognitive load hypothesis by asking children and adults to remember a list of words or 
letters while explaining how they solved a maths problem. It was found that 
significantly more words were recalled from the list when participants were allowed 
to gesture while solving the maths problem, than when they were told not to gesture. 
Gesture had the effect of reducing the cognitive demands of explanation, allowing 
limited resources to be used elsewhere, in this case on the memory task. In the case of 
the maths explanation, the task had a high spatial representation that diverted some of 
the burden from the verbal component. Thus, gesture and speech can be seen as 
complimentary ways of encoding information into a simple integrated system, each 
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enhancing the other for mutual benefit and lightening the cognitive burden as a result 
(Goldin-Meadow et al 2001). 
 
Thus, there is a growing body of literature that shows gesture to be involved in the 
process of cognitive change and development in children, by providing an alternative 
route through which information may be channelled, or by reducing the cognitive load 
(Goldin-Meadow 2000; 2002). Much of this work focuses on multiple representations 
that accompany cognitive variability, with gesture-speech mismatches taken as 
evidence that children can hold more than one representation of a problem in their 
mind at any one time.  
 
During times when children hold more than one representation, perhaps because they 
are entertaining more than one solution to a problem or activating multiple strategy 
choices, gesture production has been shown to increase. Studies to date have 
frequently invoked this dual representation explanation to account, post-hoc, for 
observed differences in children’s gesture production during times of knowledge 
transition. To date, however, the predictive validity of this notion has not been tested. 
Therefore, in our study we set out to first induce dual representations in some of the 
children and then compare their gesture production with that of children holding a 
single representation. This was achieved with a false belief story that requires children 
to hold two representations concurrently. By asking children to retell either a false 
belief or a true belief story it was possible to compare gesture production under 
conditions of dual or single representation. The hypothesis was that children in the 
false belief condition would produce more gestures as a result of activating both 
representations concurrently, in accordance with the notion that gesture may function 
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to externalise some of the child’s cognitive processes, particularly when multiple 
representations are present in the cognitive system. 
 
The ability to understand false belief appears to develop in children between the ages 
of 3 to 5 years, (Gopnik & Astington 1988, Lewis et al 1994) and at around the same 
time in all cultures throughout the world, (Avis & Harris 1991). For a child to 
understand false belief, it is necessary for them to realise that someone else can form a 
representation of a scenario that is different from their own representation of it. This 
involves the child holding two representations of that event, the reality and the false 
belief of another. Classic examples of this understanding are demonstrated by both the 
‘unexpected transfer task’ (Wimmer & Perner 1983; Siegal & Beattie 1991) and the 
‘deceptive box task’ (Perner et al 1987; Gopnik & Astington 1988; Lewis & Osborne 
1990). 
 
In order to compare gesture production in children retelling a false belief story with 
those retelling a true belief story it was necessary to ascertain, a priori, the children’s 
understanding of false belief. Children aged 5 to 6 years were recruited to the study, 
since children of that age are generally able to understand false belief. In order to 
confirm their understanding, a screening test was devised, using the standard 
‘deceptive box task’, and wording by Lewis & Osborne (1990). Only data from 
children who passed the screening test was used in the main experiment. 
 
In the main experiment the false belief story and pictures were taken from an original 
study by Lewis et al (1994) designed to investigate three-year olds’ understanding of 
false belief. In the present study different versions of a wordless storybook were 
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created for the experimental conditions in which the children would be exposed to 
either single or dual representations within a story that they would then retell in their 
own words. On retelling, gesture production in each condition was compared. It was 
predicted that children given two representations, in the false belief condition, would 
produce more gestures than those given one representation, in the true belief 
condition, as a result of activating both representations concurrently. 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Design 
A between subjects design was employed with three experimental conditions: 
Condition 1, the false belief; Condition 2, the true belief and Condition 3, the 
extended true belief. Additional independent variables included whether the child was 
a frequent gesturer or not, verbal fluency and gender. The dependent variable was the 
total number of gestures produced by children in each of the three experimental 
conditions. The hypothesis was that children in the false belief condition would 
produce more gestures as a result of activating both representations concurrently. 
 
Participants 
Eighty-four children from six Hertfordshire infant schools took part in the screening 
test, 40 boys and 44 girls. Two boys, both aged 5 years 7 months, did not want to take 
part in the main experiment. The mean ages of the remaining eighty-two children for 
the three experimental conditions were as follows: False belief, Condition 1 – mean 
5.74 years (SD 0.27), range 5 years 4 months to 6 years 3 months; True belief, 
Condition 2 – mean 5.77 years (SD 0.25), range 5 years 4 months to 6 years 3 months; 
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Extended true belief, Condition 3 – mean 5.75 years (SD 0.29), range 5 years 4 
months to 6 years 2 months. 
 
Materials 
The main experiment was divided into two phases. In phase one to screen for false 
belief understanding, a medium box of cereal, with the cereal removed, containing 
twenty buttons was used for the deceptive box test. 
 
In phase two, the storybook task, three wordless storybooks were constructed for the 
three conditions: the false belief story, the true belief story and the extended true 
belief story. The books contained eight, five and eight pages respectively hand drawn 
in colour on A4 paper, spirally bound for ease of presentation by the experimenter and 
allowing children full use of their hands for gesturing. 
 
Condition 1 - False Belief Story The book contained eight pages of pictures and text 
(see Appendix A).  The story was about a girl called Suzie who left her cat in a basket 
in the bedroom. Whilst she was away the cat slipped out of the bedroom window and 
went to the kitchen. Suzie goes back to fetch her cat and is surprised to find the empty 
basket, thus confirming her false belief.  
 
Condition 2 - True Belief Story This was the control condition and contained the same 
information as condition 1, but without the false belief component of condition 1 (see 
Appendix B). The story ends when Suzie successfully retrieves Whiskers from his 
basket, confirming Suzie’s true belief that Whiskers was in the bedroom. 
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Condition 3 – Extended True Belief Story This was a second control with additional 
information, still conforming to the true belief scenario (see Appendix C). It was 
included as a match for the false belief condition in complexity and story length. 
Additional components included Suzie and Whiskers playing in the garden with a ball 
of red wool which became tangled up in a tree. This was to match the spatial 
components of the false belief task in case additional gesturing might be attributable 
to the story’s spatial (movement) content rather than false belief.     
 
A Panasonic VHS video camera was used to record both phases of the experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Phase 1 – Screening test 
For the deceptive box test the child was shown a closed box of cereal and told that the 
experimenter had just been to the supermarket to buy the box. The child was then 
asked what they thought was inside the box. After they had given their answer, the 
box was opened and it was revealed that the box contained buttons and not cereal. The 
child was then asked ‘what would the next child think was in the box before the lid 
was opened and they were shown what was inside?’ If the child gave the correct 
response ‘cereal’ (or something similar), they undertook the next phase of the 
experiment straight away. 
  
Phase 2 – Story book task 
Children were randomly allocated to one of three experimental conditions. Each child 
was shown one set of pictures from one of three wordless picture storybooks. The 
story was narrated to the child page by page whilst they looked at the pictures and, 
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after the full story had been completed once, the whole procedure was repeated so the 
story was told twice, in full. The child was then encouraged to retell the story to the 
experimenter in their own words and in their own time, using the storybook as a 
prompt, page by page. If the child felt unable to continue, minimal prompting was 
given, such as, ‘what happened next’ or ‘tell me what you see in the picture.’  
 
The number of gestures was recorded for each of the three experimental conditions. A 
gesture was taken to be a definite iconic hand movement (McNeil 1992), over and 
above that seen in the general background movement of the child. Deictic gestures or 
self-adaptors, such as playing with the mouth, hair or hands, were not included. 
 
Effects of frequency of gesturing and fluency of speech on gesture production 
It was important to determine whether children in the false belief condition were 
either, naturally more frequent gesturers, or fluent speakers with more opportunity for 
gesturing, than those in the two true belief conditions, in order to rule out the 
possibility that these factors could account for the differences between the false and 
true belief conditions. Accordingly, the whole 5-10 minute interview was scanned for 
gesture production, which included the deceptive box task and the time devoted to the 
child, prior to the experiment, to make them feel at ease. Any gestures seen, other than 
those recorded in the recall phase of the experimental condition, were taken as an 
indication that the child was accustomed to using gesture freely. In addition, each 
child’s verbal expression of the story was also assessed for fluency.  
 
Results 
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Of the 84 participants, 82 successfully completed the deceptive box-screening task, 
and their data are included in the analysis below. 
 
What constituted a gesture? 
A gesture was taken to be a definite iconic hand movement (McNeil 1992), over and 
above that seen in the general background movement of the child. An independent 
rater examined a subset of the data (approximately 5%) and inter-rater reliability was 
92% agreement between the two coders. Discussion resolved any differences of 
opinion. The remaining 95% of the data were then classified accordingly. 
 
 
Number of gestures 
In order to compare gesture production between the three experimental conditions the 
number of gestures produced when the child retold the story during the recall phase 
was recorded. Of a total of 76 gestures produced by 82 children in all three 
experimental conditions, 52 were produced in Condition 1, the false belief condition 
(n=28), 14 gestures were produced in Condition 2, the true belief condition (n=27), 
and 10 gestures were produced in Condition 3, the extended true belief condition 
(n=27). It can be seen from Figure 1, that, on average, children gestured more in the 
false belief condition 1 (1.93, s.d. 2.60) than the true belief condition 2 (0.52, s.d. 
0.85) and the extended true belief condition 3 (0.37, s.d 0.88).  
 
Insert figure 1 about here 
 
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the data, with the three 
experimental conditions as the independent variable and means of gesture production 
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for each child as the dependent variable, which showed a significant effect of 
condition on gesture production, F (2, 79) = 7.32 p = 0.001. Furthermore, planned 
contrasts revealed that gesture production in the false belief Condition 1 was 
significantly different from: gesture production in the true belief Condition 2, t (30) = 
2.73 p = 0.01, gesture production in the true belief extended Condition 3, t (33) = 3.00 
p < 0.01 and gesture production in both true belief Conditions 2 and 3, t (33) = 2.94 p 
< 0.01. There was no significant difference in gesture production in Conditions 2 and 
3, t (52) = 0.628 p > 0.05, so simply increasing the length or complexity of the true 
belief storyline had no significant effect on gesture production. 
 
Iconic gesture types
Iconic gestures were found to fall into eleven types and are detailed in Table 1, 
together with the conditions in which they were elicited, and their percentage 
occurrence across all three experimental conditions. It can be seen that four of the 
gesture types were seen in all three conditions, one type in two conditions, and six 
types in only the false belief condition. While Condition 1 elicited gestures not seen in 
the other two conditions (24%), the majority of gestures produced in the study  (75%)  
occurred in more than one condition. Most of the pictures in the study elicited at least 
three gesture types, with the exception of picture 7 for which there were no gestures 
recorded; there were five gesture types recorded for picture 4 alone.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
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At what point during the retelling of the stories were gestures most likely to occur? 
Analysis was made of where gestures occurred. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
52 gestures produced in Condition 1. The majority of gestures (75%) occurred during 
the explanations produced relating to pictures 3-6. Pictures 4-6 were the pictures in 
which the child had to give the explanation of the false belief and were not found in 
Conditions 2 and 3. Picture 4 elicited the largest number of gestures (21%), where the 
cat left the bedroom via the window. No gestures accompanied the explanation to 
picture 7. 
 
Insert figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of 14 gestures seen for the 27 participants in 
Condition 2, which were found to coincide mainly with pictures 1 (5 gestures, 36%), 2 
(4 gestures, 29%) and 4 (3 gestures, 21%), with pictures 3 and 5 having only 1 gesture 
(7%) each.  
 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the total of 10 gestures seen for the 27 participants 
in Condition 3. The majority (7 gestures, 70%) were found to accompany picture 6, 
where the cat was winding the wool around the tree. The other three gestures were 
found accompanying pictures 2, 3 and 5 (10% each). 
 
Insert figure 4 about here 
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The five pictures that occurred in all three conditions were plotted in the same graph, 
(see Figure 5) and it can be seen that numbers of gestures for each of the pictures 
shared were largely similar for all three conditions. The exception was for picture 3 in 
Condition 1, the picture prior to the false belief section, where nine gestures were 
produced overall (17%). The child may have already been beginning to consider the 
dual representation at this stage and gesture production increased as a result.  
 
Insert figure 5 about here 
 
Effects of frequency, fluency and gender 
Participants were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions. However it 
was necessary to rule out possible confounds of frequency of gesturing, verbal fluency 
and gender as alternative explanations for the results seen. 
 
 
Frequency 
It was possible to code whether the child was a frequent gesturer or not, by examining 
gestures produced by the child prior to the recall phase of the experiment. Gestures 
observed at that time were taken as an indication that the child was accustomed to 
using gesture freely. Conversely, a child that was not seen to gesture during that time 
was classed as a non-frequent gesturer. A Chi-square analysis on all three 
experimental conditions did not reveal an association between whether a child was a 
frequent gesturer, or not, and any of the experimental conditions, χ2 (2, N = 82) = 
5.57, p > 0.05. However, it should be mentioned that there did appear to be an 
association between the false belief condition and the true belief condition, χ2 (1, N = 
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55) = 5.27, p < 0.05, but this was not considered to be a critical weakness because 
there was no association between the false belief condition and the extended true 
belief condition, χ2 (1, N = 55) = 0.44, p > 0.05.  
 
Fluency 
The child’s verbal expression of the story was assessed for verbal fluency. Lewis et al 
(1994) coded participants into three groups: poor, average and good. These were 
judged by two independent examiners and were based on fluency, elaboration, clarity 
and coherence. Kirk and Pine (2004) devised a coding system for verbal imprecision 
or disfluency, which included fillers, false starts, self-reports, metacognitive 
comments and pauses longer than three seconds. The current study made a judgement 
based on the findings of the above two studies and allocated children into two groups, 
additionally taking into account the amount of prompting required. Two groups rated 
as good or average fluency were deemed sufficient, as there were no poor performers. 
This was expected as the material was originally designed for use on three year olds 
and the average age of children in this study was 5 years 7 months. Those judged as 
having good fluency had a sound grasp of the storyline with minimal verbal 
imprecision and maximum elaboration, clarity and coherence, while those judged as 
having average fluency got the gist of the storyline, but needed prompting, had more 
than one verbal disfluency and only provided the minimum amount of commentary. 
An independent rater examined a subset of the data (approximately 5%) and inter-
rater reliability was 100% agreement between the two coders. The remaining 95 % of 
the data were classified accordingly.  
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It was expected that those who were more fluent verbally, and thus likely to say more 
during the recall phase, would be expected to produce more gestures than those who 
were less fluent, with less opportunity to gesture. It was seen from a comparison of 
the means across all three experimental conditions that those children whose fluency 
was rated as good, were nearly three times more likely to gesture than those who were 
rated as having average fluency. Children rated as having good fluency produced an 
average of 1.38 gestures (s.d. 2.34) compared to those rated as having average fluency 
producing an average of 0.55 gestures (s.d. 0.92). A Chi-square analysis did not reveal 
an association between fluency and any of the experimental conditions, χ2 (2) = 1.21, 
p > 0.05 so it was concluded that fluent gesturers were distributed evenly across all 
three experimental conditions  
 
Gender 
Finally, a Chi-square analysis revealed no association between gender and any of the 
experimental conditions, χ2 (2) = 0.59, p > 0.05  
 
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to test an inference arising from studies of gesture 
production in children that dual representations are responsible for differences in 
gesture production (Goldin-Meadow 2000; 2002), as previous work had only inferred 
this as a post-hoc explanation for children’s gesture use. It was found that by creating 
for children two representations concurrently in the form of a false belief story, 
children were four times more likely to gesture, when they retold the story, compared 
to those children who were given single representations in two true belief stories. 
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These effects were significant, and support what had been assumed in previous work 
on gesture production. The findings were in accordance with the hypothesis that 
children in the false belief condition would produce more gestures as a result of 
activating both representations concurrently. Gestures function to externalise some of 
the child’s cognitive process, particularly when multiple representations are present in 
the cognitive system. 
 
In this investigation, gesture was used by children retelling a false belief story to assist 
with the added complexity of the dual representation. The findings add further weight 
to Goldin-Meadow’s postulations that gesture functions to reduce cognitive load or 
provide an alternative route for expression through which some information can be 
channelled (Goldin-Meadow 2000; 2002). This was demonstrated by the fact that 
children were nearly four times more likely to use gesture in the false belief condition 
than in either of the true belief conditions. The conditions were made as comparable 
as possible in an attempt to manipulate only the false belief component whilst holding 
other variables constant. True belief Condition 2 and extended true belief Condition 3 
contained the same five pictures as false belief Condition 1, but the false belief aspect 
was omitted by removing pictures 4-6. However, in order to rule out the possibility 
that length or cognitive load of the story alone affected gesture production, Condition 
3 contained three new pictures with comparable movement to the pictures that had 
been removed, while maintaining the single representation in the story. The results 
showed no significant difference between gesture production in both true belief 
Conditions 2 and 3, and so the increased gesture production in Condition 1 was 
attributed to the dual representation associated with false belief. Other possible 
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confounds such as being a frequent gesturer, verbal fluency and gender were ruled out 
as possible alternative explanations.  
 
Gesture production was seen to increase at the point of the more complex dual 
representation in the story; 75% of the gestures produced in Condition 1 accompanied 
pictures 3-6, with maximum gesture production for picture 4. Pictures 4-6 related to 
the false belief aspect of the story and it was likely that gesture was used here to assist 
the child with representing the two sides of the story by relieving the cognitive 
burden. Increased gesturing in conjunction with picture 3 could be attributed to the 
child beginning to activate and consider the dual representation. Furthermore, gesture 
production in all three conditions was compared by plotting the numbers of gestures 
for the five pictures common to all three experimental conditions on the same graph. 
Gesture production did not differ for the pictures shared in all three conditions, except 
for picture 3 in Condition 1. Therefore the increased gesture production seen in 
Condition 1, attributed to the dual representation, corresponded to the actual pictures 
4-6 that explained the false belief aspect, as the other pictures in condition 1 did not 
elicit any more gestures than Conditions 2 and 3. 
 
Qualitative differences were seen in the gestures produced across the experimental 
conditions, as six of the eleven gesture types produced were observed only in the false 
belief condition and were used specifically to help explain the false belief component 
of the story. Examples include children shaking their head or covering their mouth 
when the cat did not want to stay in the bedroom, or using a flat hand to denote the 
warmth and preference of the kitchen. The type of gesture used appeared to depend on 
the individual child rather than the picture. One child, for example, produced a total of 
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six gestures and was the only participant to produce ‘shivering’ and ‘sleeping’ 
gestures; their remaining gestures were all ‘walking finger’ gestures. Another 
produced a total of six gestures, but was the only participant to produce the ‘naughty 
mouth’ gesture, three times in three different pictures, their remaining gestures were 
‘in or out’ and ‘sweeping arm’ gestures. However these six gestures constituted only 
24% of the total number of gestures produced and overall, the remaining five gesture 
types encompassed the majority of gestures produced (75%), 70% of which occurred 
in all three experimental conditions. It can therefore be said that the majority of 
gestures produced in the false belief condition were typical of gestures produced in 
the other two conditions, but that the condition simply elicited more of them and at 
crucial times.  
 
Were gestures used to reduce the cognitive load for the children? It is possible that 
they functioned to divert some of the cognitive burden from a verbal component to a 
spatial component (as found by Goldin-Meadow et al (2001), Alibali, Kita and Young 
(2000)). For example, an ‘in or out’ gesture appeared to be used to represent motion in 
all three conditions, without need for further elaboration, namely, the movement of 
the cat, the girl going out to play and turning the television on. Another example is the 
use of a spiral movement of the hand, which helped to describe both the wool being 
tangled in the tree in Condition 3 and the cat leaving through one window and 
returning through another. Two gesture speech mismatches were identified, 
demonstrating the asymmetry in the repertoires of speech and gesture (Goldin-
Meadow, Alibali & Church 1993), both in Condition 1, picture 3, where the girl 
moved from the bedroom to the lounge to watch her favourite television program. 
Participant 4 gave a ‘naughty mouth’ gesture while verbally explaining that the girl 
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“went to watch Tweenies,” implying that the cat was not complying with the girl’s 
wishes, but not explicitly stating the fact. While participant 7 gave a ‘sweeping arm’ 
gesture, implying the cat was sleeping on the chair, which did not match the verbal 
statement “she went to watch her favourite program.” Here, it would appear that the 
gestures were produced to help the children explain the multiple representations in the 
false belief story.  
 
The children in this study did not produce enough gesture-speech mismatches for a 
valid comparison of mismatches between the true and false belief conditions. This 
was partly due to the task itself, as other studies that have elicited gesture-speech 
mismatches have utilised highly spatial tasks involving tangible materials and the 
explanation of physical forces, particularly in the balance beam task (Pine et al., 
2004).  
 
These findings confirm that gesture production arises when children have more than 
one representation, and is the first to have manipulated this experimentally. This has 
important implications for the role of gestures during knowledge acquisition. Since 
gesture is an integral part of the process of cognitive change (Goldin-Meadow 2000; 
2002) schools should allow, and even actively encourage children to gesture freely in 
order for them to reach their full potential. This will give the child the freedom to try 
out new strategies in the form of gesture that are not yet ready for verbalising, or to 
convey representations that are not linguistically coded but are, nonetheless, part of 
the child’s developing knowledge.  
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Appendix A 
Condition 1      False Belief Storyline (eight pictures)
As condition 2 plus three extra pictures, (4, 5, and 6) and modifications to picture 8 - 
Differences to condition 2 are underlined 
(1) As (1) in condition 2  
(2) As (2) in condition 2  
(3) As (3) in condition 2  
(4) But Whiskers did not want to sleep in the bedroom because it was too cold. Once 
Susie had gone, Whiskers got up out of his basket and climbed out through the 
bedroom window. 
(Picture shows Whiskers climbing out of the open window). 
(5) Whiskers knew it would be nice and warm in the kitchen, so he climbed in through 
the kitchen window. 
(Picture shows Whiskers climbing in through the kitchen window). 
(6) Whiskers found a nice, cosy chair in the kitchen and went to sleep. 
(Picture shows Whiskers sleeping on a chair in the kitchen). 
(7) As (4) in condition 2  
(8) Susie went back into the bedroom, but to her surprise the cat basket was empty. 
Where was Whiskers? 
(Picture shows Susie in the bedroom looking at the empty cat basket). 
 
Appendix B 
Condition 2       True Belief Storyline (five pictures) 
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(1) This is Susie and this is Susie’s cat called Whiskers. They are standing in the 
lounge. There are two rooms either side of the television. This is the bedroom and this 
is the kitchen. (The rooms will be pointed out). 
(Picture shows Susie holding her cat standing in front of the television in the 
lounge. The television is in between the bedroom and the kitchen doors). 
(2) Susie carried Whiskers into the bedroom and lifted Whiskers down into his basket 
so that he could go to sleep. 
(Picture shows Susie putting Whiskers into the basket). 
(3) Susie went back into the lounge to watch the television. Her favourite program 
was on. (To child) What is your favourite television program? (Child’s reply) Suzie is 
watching ---- (substitute child’s favourite program) 
(Picture shows Susie watching television). 
(4) When (child’s favourite program) was over she switched off the television and 
decided to go and get Whiskers so that they could play together in the garden. 
(Picture shows Susie switching off the television). 
(5) Susie went back into the bedroom and found Whiskers sleeping in his basket. 
Susie lifted Whiskers up out of the basket. ‘Come on Whiskers’, said Susie, ‘time to 
play in the garden’. 
(Picture shows Susie lifting Whiskers up from the basket). 
 
Appendix C 
Condition 3  Extended True Belief Storyline (eight pictures) 
As condition 2 plus three extra pictures (6), (7) & (8). Same length as condition 1 – 
all differences from condition 2 are underlined. 
(1) As (1) in condition 2 
 24
Dual Representations 
(2) As (2) in condition 2  
(3) As (3) in condition 2 
(4) As (4) in condition 2  
(5) As (5) in condition 2 
(6) Susie and Whiskers played with a big ball of red wool. Susie laughed as Whiskers 
chased the wool round and round a tree in the garden and the wool became all tangled 
up. 
(Picture shows the wool wrapped around a tree). 
(7) After a while it was Whiskers’ dinner time so Susie left the garden and went into 
the kitchen to open a tin of cat food.  
(Picture shows Susie putting food in Whiskers’ bowl). 
(8) ‘Whiskers’ shouted Susie, ‘time for dinner’.  Whiskers ran into the kitchen, 
straight to his bowl and began to eat his dinner. Susie and Whiskers were great 
friends. 
(Picture shows Whiskers eating his dinner). 
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Figure 1 Showing mean gesture production per child in false belief Condition 1, true 
belief Condition 2 and extended true belief Condition 3 
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Figure 2 Showing distribution of gestures across pictures in the false belief condition 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Picture numbers in condition 1
To
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f g
es
tu
re
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 p
ic
tu
re
 
 27
Dual Representations 
Figure 3 Showing distribution of gestures across pictures in the true belief condition  
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Figure 4 Showing distribution of gestures across pictures in the extended true belief 
condition  
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Figure 5 Showing distribution of gestures across only those five pictures appearing in 
all three conditions  (NB Condition 1, false belief  – actual pictures 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8. 
Condition 2, true belief  – actual pictures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Condition 3, extended true 
belief  – actual pictures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) 
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Table 1 
Frequency and type of iconic gestures seen across all three experimental conditions. 
 
Gesture 
Name 
Occurrence Description (condition) Condition
‘in’ or ‘out’  46% Motioning with a hand, fist, arm or 
finger(s) the cats movements (1), going out 
to play (3) and general movements, e.g., 
turning TV on and putting cat in basket (1, 
2, 3) 
1, 2, 3 
walking 
fingers 
13% First two fingers on same hand in walking 
motion indicating movement of cat 
1 
sweeping flat 
hand 
11% Often accompanied reference to the cat 
‘sleeping on the chair’ where it was ‘nice 
and warm’ (1) or putting the cat to sleep (1, 
2, 3) 
1, 2, 3 
two rooms 8% Used two fingers on the same hand to 
differentiate the two rooms (1, 2, 3) - not 
deictic 
1, 2, 3 
tapping (table 
or other 
hand) 
5% Symbolised turning the television on or off 
(1, 2, 3) and used emphatically, e.g., when 
the cat did not want to sleep in the basket 
(1) 
1, 2, 3 
spiral 
movement  
of the hand 
5% Helped to explain the cat going in one 
window and out of the other (1) or the wool 
being wrapped around the tree (3) 
1, 3 
empty hands 4% Lifted both palms upwards to show the cat 
was not in the basket 
1 
naughty 
mouth 
4% Covered hands with mouth, signifying that 
the cat was naughty 
1 
shake of head  
or a shrug 
1% Indicated the cat did not want to do 
something 
1 
shivering 1% Denoted the ‘cold’ kitchen 
 
1 
sleeping 1% Hands placed at side of head, palms 
together to signify ‘sleep’ 
1 
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